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TOPIC IV.C.1
TANG THANH TRAI LE
The Legal Status of the Refugee in the United States
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. Introduction
Political asylum symbolizes a uniquely American ideal. The
United States traces this attitude to its status as a country of immi-
grants-or, more precisely, as a country of refugees, seeing as how so
much of its population emigrated in flight from some sort of persecu-
tion. As the Statue of Liberty proclaims: "Give me your tired, your
poor,/your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,/The wretched re-
fuse of your teeming shore,/Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed
to me;/I lift my lamp beside the golden door."1 While the United
States immortalized this invitation to sufferers of political and eco-
nomic hardship in New York's harbor, though, it did not perceive a
need to codify this guarantee in the statute books. In fact, until well
into the twentieth century, the United States did not distinguish ref-
ugees from other immigrants.
World War II brought a major sea change in the way countries
handled refugee issues, as countless numbers of displaced persons
awaited resettlement. As a result, the United States began to distin-
guish refugees from general immigrants. Yet at first glance, the
manner in which the United States has tackled refugee dilemmas ap-
pears an incoherent jumble, with problems only resolved in an ad hoc
way. For instance, while the United States played an instrumental
role in helping to draft the United Nations Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees,2 which remains the basis for protection of ref-
ugees in the international community, it refused to bind itself to the
Convention until it acceded to the subsequent Protocol sixteen years
TANG THANH Tam LE is Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School.
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1. Lazarus, 'The New Colossus (1886)," in, Emma Lazarus, Selections from Her
Poetry and Prose 40-41 (Morris U. Schappes ed. 1944). Note that the Statue of Lib-
erty beckons victims of economic persecution at least as vigorously as victims of polit-
ical persecution.
2. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (hereinafter "Convention").
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later,3 and even then it did not pass legislation implementing the
Convention standards for another thirteen years.4 Meanwhile, its
domestic law provided little to protect refugees beyond sporadic use
of the parole power to admit refugees from communist nations when
the need arose. 5
The breaking point for U.S. refugee policy, as with many other
facets of U.S. policy, came with the Vietnamese debacle. An intense
awareness of responsibility for the travails of the people the United
States had attempted to protect for over a decade led Americans to
accept large numbers of refugees from Indochina in the mid-1970s.6
The resulting disorganization convinced American policymakers that
the U.S. simply could no longer continue to handle mass refugee
flows in an unsystematic manner. In an effort to provide more con-
sistency, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, which established
procedures for admitting refugees and handling asylum applica-
tions.7 Even after 1980, however, the United States chose to deal
with some migration problems outside of the established procedures,
including grants of special status to the Cuban migrants in 19808 and
to the asylum seekers from El Salvador in 1990.9
In 1957, author Robert Divine listed four driving forces of U.S.
immigration policy, including economic analyses of the effect of immi-
grants; social factors, primarily those involving race or ethnicity; na-
tionalistic tendencies to limit all immigration for the purported
benefit of those already in the United States; and foreign policy con-
siderations. 10 These underlying motivations have proven remarka-
bly stable throughout American history, both in general and with
3. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S.
267.
4. Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
5. See infra nn. 35-36 and accompanying text.
6. From March 1975 to May 1979, "over 205,000 Indochinese refugees have en-
tered the United States, primarily under the parole provision." Congressional Re-
search Service, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Review of U.S. Refugee Resettlement Programs
and Policies 33 (Comm. Print 1979) (hereinafter Refugee Resettlement Review).
7. The Act itself stressed its goal of providing "a permanent and systematic pro-
cedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern
to the United States...." Refugee Act, supra n. 4, at § 101.
8. In June 1980, Cuban and Haitian migrants received "special entrant" status,
whereby they could stay in the United States but could not apply for refugee status or
asylum. In 1984, Cubans entering in this way became eligible for permanent resident
status. See generally Norman L. Zucker & Naomi Flink Zucker, The Guarded Gate:
The Reality of America's Refugee Policy 68 (1987); Gil Loescher & John A. Scanlan,
Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America's Half-Open Door, 1945 to the Present at
186 (1986) (discussing "special entrant" status for Cubans and Haitians).
9. In 1990, in no small part due to lawsuits brought by El Salvadoran asylum
applicants (see infra nn. 101-102 and accompanying text), Congress extended "tempo-
rary protected status" (thus preventing deportation) to Salvadoran nationals; see in-
fra n. 277 and accompanying text.
10. Robert A. Divine, American Immigration Policy 1924-1952 at 25 (1957).
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regard to United States refugee policy; the major differences center
on which factors receive the most emphasis at any particular time.
B. U.S. Refugee Policy Before World War II
The dominant attitude during this period permitted admission of
refugees, as well as other immigrants, although domestic policy con-
cerns occasionally compelled restriction. Before World War I, the
United States essentially did not limit immigration admissions in
general. The acute need for as much development as possible created
a powerful incentive to accept as many people as possible. The fed-
eral government did not regulate immigration in any way until
1882,11 and most of the restrictions between 1882 and 1917 largely
centered on moral crusades to exclude "undesirables", including con-
victs and persons suffering from physical or mental illness. 12 These
restrictions did not aim to significantly limit the volume of immigra-
tion, and thus did not particularly affect refugees.
The notable exception to this liberal policy concerned Chinese
immigrants. In what current observers universally condemn as an
episode of blatant racism, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act
of 1882, which, as the title implied, excluded all Chinese from en-
try.13 This extended in 1921 to an "Asiatic barred zone" covering im-
migrants from China, Japan, and Korea,' 4 as part of a system of
worldwide quotas tied to census data of the racial makeup of the
United States, in an attempt to maintain racial homogeneity and to
explicitly limit immigration on a racial basis. 15 The Chinese exclu-
sion remained entrenched until 1943,16 when the U.S. lifted the ban
in order to further its wartime foreign policy.17
Starting in 1917, the United States, mindful of the huge waves of
immigrants crossing its borders, barred admission to persons likely
to become "public charges" and established a literacy test for admis-
sion, although those people who could demonstrate that they had fled
11. For discussions of United States refugee law prior to World War II, see gener-
ally 2 Charles Gordon & Stanley Mailman, Immigration Law and Procedure § 33.01
(1993); Divine, supra n. 10, at 92-109; Lewis & Schibsby, "Status of the Refugee
Under American Immigration Laws," 203 Annals 74 (1939).
12. See generally Vialet, "A Brief History of U.S. Immigration Policy (1980)," in
Arnold H. Liebowitz, Immigration Law and Refugee Policy § 1.01 (1983); Lewis &
Schibsby, supra n. 11, at 74.
13. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882). See generally
Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian-Americans 110-
112 (1989).
14. Immigration Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5.
15. For a discussion of the determination of racial makeup, see Divine, supra n.
10, at 26-50.
16. Indeed, no significant movement for repeal even commenced until 1942. Id.
at 147.
17. Id. at 152.
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religious persecution did not have to pass the literacy test.18 The re-
strictive effect of the new laws became painfully evident in 1930,
when, in the throes of the Great Depression, President Hoover or-
dered reinterpretation of the "public charge" requirement. The State
Department complied by announcing that any immigrant unlikely to
obtain a job upon arrival or to have other sufficient means of survival
would receive exclusion as a "public charge". 19 Not surprisingly, im-
migrant admissions plummeted in the wake of the reinterpretation;
refugees particularly suffered because they had less likelihood of sat-
isfying the "public charge" test than other immigrants. 20
The tragic climax of the domestic policy fixation came with the
refusal to admit refugees fleeing Hitler's reign of terror. 67% of
Americans opposed any increased admission of refugees in 1938;21 by
1939, despite Hitler's accelerated persecution, fully 83% of Ameri-
cans, recognizing the potential scope of increased admissions and still
fearful of economic competition, rejected any increased refugee
admissions. 22
C. U.S. Refugee Policy During the Cold War
Two factors combined to convince the United States to pursue a
more expansive refugee policy after World War II ended. First, the
rejection of refugees fleeing persecution at Hitler's hands remained
fresh in the minds of Americans, and the United States resolved not
to refuse refugees from potential enemies again. 23 Second, the
United States had rapidly ascended to a position of global leadership,
necessitating it to lead in the response to the refugees the war cre-
ated.24 Thus, when the United States cast the Soviet Union as a di-
rect threat to peace, the U.S. decided to admit as many refugees as
possible from communist countries in order to emphasize its position
as the leader of the "free world". That is, foreign policy considera-
tions took on greater emphasis in relation to domestic concerns as
refugee policy became a tool of containment.25
18. Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874.
19. Department of State, 3 Press Releases 176-77 (Sept. 11, 1930). See generally
Divine, supra n. 10, at 78.
20. See generally Divine, supra n. 10, at 78.
21. "The Fortune Survey," Fortune, July 1938, at 80, in Divine, supra n. 10, at 96.
22. "The Fortune Survey," Fortune, April 1939, at 102, in Divine, supra n. 10, at
99.
23. 2 Gordon & Mailman, supra n. 11, § 33.01.
24. Id.
25. Divine, supra n. 10, at 109. For general discussions of the development of
U.S. legislation pertaining to refugees from World War II to the passage of the Refu-
gee Act of 1980, see generally Refugee Resettlement Review, supra n. 6; Anker &
Posner, "The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980," 19
San Diego L. Rev. 9 (1981); Cavosie, "Defending the Golden Door: The Persistence of
Ad Hoc and Ideological Decision Making in U.S. Refugee Law," 67 Ind. L.J. 411
(1992).
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The United States quickly translated its newly perceived foreign
policy interests into a major role in postwar international refugee is-
sues. The United States played a pivotal role in the International
Refugee Organization (IRO), the first international attempt to handle
refugee concerns; the United States and United Kingdom accounted
for 60% of the IRO budget.26 The purposes of the IRO inevitably re-
flected the desires of its leading contributors. The IRO dealt primar-
ily with refugees from World War II, especially those fleeing
communist regimes in eastern Europe. 27
By 1949, the Secretary General of the United Nations had con-
cluded that the problem of stateless persons required a more compre-
hensive solution; this new emphasis ultimately resulted in the
drafting of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 28 The
Soviet bloc, not wishing to validate the increasing exodus of its citi-
zens, withdrew from the drafting of the Convention, saying that per-
sons unwilling to return to their country of origin represented
"traitors" and did not deserve any international protection.29 This
meant the Western countries had a free hand to shape the Conven-
tion to suit their own purposes. Therefore, the Western-inspired
Convention focused on protecting the refugees from World War II and
the ideological refugees of Eastern Europe as opposed to political ref-
ugees in general, "economic refugees" fleeing due to a deprivation of
socioeconomic rights, or persons suffering from persecution as a re-
sult of famine, civil unrest, or natural disaster.30 In addition, by
leaving interpretation of the provisions, including determination of
refugee status, to the member states, the United States could use the
Convention for ideological purposes by assuming that any person
fleeing a communist nation had a well-founded fear of persecution.31
Further, the Western countries carefully ensured that the duty of
nonrefoulement would not entail a duty to grant asylum to qualifying
refugees. 32 Although it participated in its drafting, the United States
26. Leon Gordecker, Refugees in International Politics 25-26 (1987).
27. Id. at 26-27; Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the
Twentieth Century 343 (1985).
28. Hathaway, "A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law,"
31 Harv. Int'l L.J. 129, 144 (1990).
29. See id. at 145.
30. See U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems
at 5, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.5 (1950) (statement of Mr. Henkin, United States), re-
printed in 1 Alex Takkenberg & Christopher C. Tahbaz, The Collected Travaux
Preparatoires of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 175(1990); U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless
Persons at 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.21 (1951) (statement of Mr. Warren, United
States), reprinted in 3 Takkenberg & Tahbaz, supra, at 401. See generally
Hathaway, supra n. 28, at 149-50.
31. Hathaway, supra n. 28, at 150.
32. Cf. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Handbook
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status" §§ 24, 25 (1979) (herein-
after Handbook).
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never became a party to the Convention. In a very real sense,
though, the Convention reflected the various goals of the United
States; humanitarian protection of political refugees through the
Convention became the goal of the United States, but only because it
perceived the goal as furthering its foreign policy interest of
containment.
The United States took great pains to ensure that its domestic
refugee policy reflected its foreign policy concerns. Although refugees
still had to enter through the general immigration quota, the first
legislation in the postwar period, the Displaced Persons Act of
1948, 33 "mortgaged" the immigration quotas to allow for admission of
those displaced by World War II. The Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA),34 a landmark statute passed in 1952 establishing a frame-
work for immigration policy, took two important steps with regard to
refugees. The Attorney General received discretionary authority to
parole any alien into the United States "for emergent reasons or for
reasons deemed strictly in the public interest."35 The United States
would come to use this for mass paroles of communist refugees,
although it did not utilize mass parole for non-communists. 36 The
Attorney General also received discretionary authority to withhold
deportation if the immigrant faced physical persecution. 37
In 1953, the United States, again attempting to "discharge re-
sponsibilities towards persons uprooted by the war" and to "make a
gesture to the anti-communist preoccupation of the Cold War Era",38
passed the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. 39 This allowed for the first
time full-fledged entry of refugees above the quota limits. The law,
however, limited eligibility to "refugees" in nations with anticom-
munist policies the United States sought to reinforce, "escapees" from
a "Communist, Communist-dominated or Communist-occupied area",
and "German expellees" from communist regions.40 A 1957 act fur-
ther consolidated the Cold War preoccupation by defining refugees as
aliens fleeing a communist or communist-dominated country or an
33. Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009.
34. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
35. Id., § 212(d)(5).
36. The most extensive uses of the parole power granted entry to Hungarians in
the 1950's, Cubans in the 1960's and 1970's, and Indochinese after 1975. The United
States did use the parole power to sporadically admit small numbers of refugees from
non-communist nations, but this represented an undeniably secondary use of the
power. See generally Zucker & Zucker, supra n. 8, at 55; Refugee Resettlement Re-
view, supra n. 6, at 10-11.
37. INA, supra n. 34, § 243(h). This incorporated the standard used in the Inter-
nal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987, an exception to a law which
made exclusion of immigrants easier because it authorized deportation of noncitizens
engaging in "subversive" activities.
38. Anker & Posner, supra n. 25, at 13.
39. Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400.
40. Id., §§ 2, 4. See Anker & Posner, supra n. 25, at 14.
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area of the Middle East.41 These acts represented ad hoc solutions to
refugee issues; the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of
1965 attempted to provide a more permanent statutory basis for refu-
gee admissions by permitting the so-called "conditional entry" of cer-
tain aliens under the "seventh preference" designation.42 Borrowing
from the 1957 act, conditional entry applied to those fleeing from a
communist or communist-dominated area or from the Middle East on
account of race, religion, or political opinion. 43 This preference, obvi-
ously, ran counter to the non-discrimination principle stated in Arti-
cle 3 of the Convention, a principle deemed so crucial that signatories
could not subject it to a reservation when becoming a party to the
Convention. 44
In 1968, the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, 45 which incorporated the provisions of the
Convention and extended them to all refugees regardless of time and
location. Congress, however, passed no implementing legislation un-
til 1980. By then, critics found that the previous statutory definitions
proved "clearly unresponsive to the current diversity of refugee popu-
lations and does not adequately reflect the United States' traditional
humanitarian concern for refugees throughout the world."46 Defin-
ing "refugee" in accordance with the Convention, Congress thought,
would represent a "significant humanitarian gesture"47 and alleviate
"the current immigration law's discriminatory treatment of refu-
gees... ."48 Further, the continued use of the parole power to admit
huge numbers of refugees frustrated Congress because Congress re-
tained no meaningful role in the admission of refugees. 49
All of these problems led Congress to enact the Refugee Act of
1980, generally viewed as "the first comprehensive refugee legisla-
tion" enacted by the United States. 50 The Act essentially adopted the
Convention definition of "refugee"51 and aimed to set U.S. refugee
policy along a nondiscriminatory path, as advocates stressed
41. Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639, 643 (1957).
42. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
43. Id., § 3.
44. Convention, supra n. 2, at Art. 42.
45. See supra n. 3.
46. H. Rep. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979).
47. 125 Cong. Rec. 37,241 (1979) (statement of Rep. Weiss).
48. S. Rep. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
142.
49. See generally Anker & Posner, supra n. 25, at 12-20.
50. Refugee Act, supra n. 4; Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and Policy
832 (1992).
51. Refugee Act, supra n. 4, § 201. The Convention defines "refugee" as any per-
son who "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country...." Convention, supra n. 2, at Art. 1, sec.
A(2).
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throughout the legislative history of the Act. 52 The Act established a
procedure of determining ceilings of refugees from each region that
would gain eligibility for admission each year, with the admissions
"allocated among refugees of special humanitarian concern to the
United States .... ,,53 The President could only exceed these ceilings if
admitting more refugees satisfied "grave humanitarian concerns or is
otherwise in the national interest" and Congress assented.5 4
Through these safeguards, Congress wished to emphasize admission
through the regular ceilings rather than through the modified parole
power. 55 In limiting entry to refugees of "special humanitarian con-
cern" to the United States, Congress "intend[ed] to emphasize that
the plight of the refugees themselves as opposed to national origins or
political considerations should be paramount in determining which
refugees are to be admitted to the United States."56 Indeed, some
members of Congress indicated that they would scrutinize the refu-
gee quotas set under the Act so that the quotas would "be equitably
distributed amongst the refugees of the world and will not be tainted
with ideological, geographical or racial or ethnic biases .... ,,57
The Refugee Act also established for the first time procedures to
cover claims of political asylum by migrants either in the United
States or at the border, with the Attorney General receiving discre-
tion to grant asylum to aliens establishing refugee status under the
Convention definition. 58 The Act made nonrefoulement mandatory,
as the Convention required, upon a determination that the "alien's
life or freedom would be threatened.. .on account of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."59
52. The Convention states that nations "shall apply the provisions of this Con-
vention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin."
Convention, supra n. 2, at Art. 3. For evidence of congressional intent regarding erad-
ication of discrimination with the Refugee Act, see, e.g., "The Refugee Act of 1979:
Hearings on S.643 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary," 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9, 11 (1979) (statement of Ambassador-at-Large Dick Clark, U.S. Coordinator
for Refugee Affairs); S. Rep. No. 256, supra n. 48, at 141; H. Rep. No. 608, supra n. 46,
at 1; 126 Cong. Rec. 4,501 (1980) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
53. Refugee Act, supra n. 4, § 201.
54. Id.
55. See H. Rep. No. 608, supra n. 46, at 4-5. In fact, the House construed "grave
humanitarian concern", the criteria for emergency admissions, as limited to "situa-
tions where the refugees' lives are placed in immediate jeopardy, where their personal
safety is threatened or where there is an imminent possibility of loss of freedom." Id.
at 12.
56. Id. at 13. The Senate had used the phrase "special concern", but it shared
similar attitudes about the need for evenhanded implementation. See S. Rep. No.
256, supra n. 48, at 146-47.
57. 126 Cong. Rec. 4,507-08 (1980) (statement of Rep. Chisholm).
58. Refugee Act, supra n. 4, § 201.
59. Id., § 203(e).
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II. COMPLIANCE RECORD
The provisions of the Refugee Act continue to form the underly-
ing structure of U.S. refugee policy; the implementation of the Act
represents the primary basis for judging the extent of United States
compliance with the norms of the Convention. The following sections
will evaluate the compliance record of the United States since pas-
sage of the Refugee Act by tracing the path of the potential refugee
from the country of origin to final acceptance in the United States as
a refugee.
A. Alienage
The Convention allows a person to claim refugee status only if
the person is "outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or
...unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.... "6 0
This allows signatories to ignore the large number of people trapped
in circumstances similar to those of refugees but who cannot escape
their home countries.61 The United States holds its applicants for
asylum to this prerequisite and eschews any more generous policy,
but has taken a more liberal viewpoint regarding applicants for refu-
gee status. Regarding refugee status, the United States does go be-
yond the Convention's alienage requirement in the Refugee Act by
allowing persons to apply for refugee status from within the country
of alleged persecution if the President has specified that country by
law.62 Currently, the President has designated people living in Viet-
nam, Cuba, Haiti, and the former Soviet Union as eligible for refugee
status in this manner. 63 Regarding asylum applicants, though,
United States courts have determined that if an asylum applicant
could have received the protection of the country of nationality in an-
other region of that country, persecution in a section of the country
has not demonstrated that the country of nationality is unable or un-
willing to protect the person.64 The asylum interpretation may run
counter to the guidelines in the United Nations Handbook on Proce-
60. Convention, supra n. 2, at Art. l(A)(2).
61. James C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status 232 (1991).
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (1988).
63. 58 Fed. Reg. 52214 (1993). A growing number of Haitians, skeptical of the
prospects for peace and unable to exit the country because of the interdiction policy of
the United States, have applied for refugee status in this way. The willingness and
ability of the United States to admit worthy Haitian applicants will go a long way
toward determining the effectiveness of this provision of the law. See Maass, "More
Haitians Seeking Asylum: Problem May Accelerate as Nation's Residents Lose Faith,"
Dallas Morning News, Dec. 21, 1993, at 37A.
64. Etugh v. INS, 921 F.2d 36 (3rd Cir. 1990); Matter of R-, Interim Decision No.
3195 (BIA 1992).
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dures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status,65 but it does not
appear to contradict the plain language of the Convention definition.
B. Return En Route
For over a decade, the United States has intercepted Haitians on
the high seas and forcibly returned them to Haiti, in order to de-
crease the number of Haitians entering the country. In 1981 Presi-
dent Reagan entered into an agreement with the Haitian government
to "interdict" Haitian vessels bound for the United States, with the
only refugee screening consisting of short interviews on Coast Guard
ships.6 6 In 1992, responding to a large increase in Haitian migration
flowing from a military coup, President Bush ordered interdiction
and return with no refugee screening whatsoever. 67 Although Presi-
dent Clinton had denounced the Bush policy during the presidential
campaign, 68 the Clinton Administration continues to forcibly inter-
dict all Haitian boats headed toward the United States.69 This policy
marks the second occasion that a Convention signatory has repatri-
ated potential refugees without any screening.70
Refugee advocates challenged the Bush policy in court, charging
that the policy violated both U.S. law and the nonrefoulement provi-
sions of the Convention. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
United States could interdict Haitians on the high seas and return
them to Haiti without making any determination of refugee status. 71
The Court ruled that the words "deport or return" in the section of
the Refugee Act pertaining to withholding of deportation referred
only to persons subject to deportation or exclusion hearings, 72 thus
refusing to give the Act extraterritorial reach. 73 The Court further
argued that the word "refouler" in Article 33 of the Convention re-
65. Handbook, supra n. 32, § 91 ("The fear of being persecuted need not always
extend to the whole territory of the refugee's country of nationality ..... [A] person will
not be excluded from refugee status merely because he could have sought refuge in
another part of the same country, if under all the circumstances it would not have
been reasonable to expect him to do so.").
66. Agreement Signed at Port-au-Prince, Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T.
3559, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241.
67. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
68. See, e.g., Bill Clinton & Al Gore, Putting People First: How We Can All
Change America 119 (1992).
69. See, e.g., Holmes, "Pressure Builds Over Return of Boat People to Haiti," N.Y
Times, Dec. 17, 1993, at A17.
70. Sontag, "Reneging on Refuge: The Haitian Precedent," N.Y Times, June 27,
1993, sec. 4, at 1. The other occasion involved Italy's forcible return of Albanians in
1991.
71. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (hereinafter Sale I).
72. Id. at 2561. Deportation refers to the process of removing an alien physically
present within the United States. Exclusion refers to the process of barring an alien
present at the border from entering the United States. Because the Haitians had not
reached the border, they obviously had not gained the right to either a deportation or
an exclusion hearing, at least technically.
73. Id. at 2560.
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ferred to "a defensive act of resistance or exclusion at a border rather
than an act of transporting someone to a particular destination,"74
and thus applied only to persons "on the threshold of initial entry."7 5
The Court also looked at the negotiating history of the Convention
and found that the parties did not intend for the word "refouler" to
include persons beyond the territory of the country.76
Refugee advocates chastised the Court's narrow interpretation of
the Convention and warned that restrictive policies would become
more widespread, both in the United States and abroad.77 The
UNHCR condemned the ruling as a "major setback to modem inter-
national refugee law."78 In a technical legal sense, the United States
may indeed not have undertaken an obligation to interpret the Con-
vention more liberally than the terms require. 79 In fact, the Court's
view of the proper scope of the nonrefoulement guarantee finds some
support among refugee law experts.80 Even if the ruling proves tech-
nically correct, though, it undercut the spirit of the nonrefoulement
provision in Article 33 of the Convention, as the Court's opinion con-
ceded.8 ' The decision, then, reflects an outgrowth of the "compassion
fatigue" phenomenon which pervades the United States in a time of
perceived social and economic difficulties.
The United States indicated its willingness to extend interdiction
strategies beyond Haiti when it intercepted three boats containing
659 Chinese immigrants in international waters off the coast of Mex-
ico. Although INS officials and UNHCR officials screened the mi-
grants before turning the rejected applicants over to Mexico for
return to China, only one person survived both screening processes
74. Id. at 2564. Article 33 reads: "No Contracting State shall expel or return
("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a political social group or political opinion." Convention, supra n. 2, at
Art. 33(1). The Court arrived at this conclusion in part by wading through various
definitions of "refouler" in two French-English dictionaries. Sale I, 113 S. Ct. at 2564
nn. 37-39.
75. Sale I, 113 S. Ct. at 2563.
76. Id. at 2567. The Court emphasized that the Dutch representative had this
interpretation "placed on record", although the delegates did not explicitly adopt the
interpretation, id. at 2566, and that the Swiss delegation may have conditioned its
acceptance of the Convention on this interpretation as well. Id. at 2567 n. 44.
77. Sontag, supra n. 70, at sec. 4, 1.
78. Id.
79. 1 Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law § 67 (1966)
("[A] State does not commit any breach of its international obligations if its interprets
and applies the provisions of a humanitarian convention literally and not liberally,
always provided that it acts in conformity with the principle of good faith....").
80. See 2 Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law § 178
(1972) (Article 33 "may only be invoked in respect of persons who are already present
- lawfully or unlawfully - in the territory of a Contracting State."); id., § 210 ("[Ilt is
entirely permissible - as far as the Refugee Convention and the.. .Protocol are con-
cerned - to prevent a refugee from entering the territory."). But see Guy Goodwin-
Gill, The Refugee in International Law 74-76, 95 (1983).
81. Sale I, 113 S. Ct. at 2563.
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and reached the United States.8 2 As it did with the Haitians, the
United States successfully avoided having to confront a large number
of asylum applicants through its high seas interdiction, but this pol-
icy obviously raises questions about United States compliance with
the spirit, if not the letter, of the nonrefoulement provision in Article
33 of the Convention.8 3
C. Individualized Hearings and Detention of Asylum Seekers
The person who successfully makes it to the border of the United
States must have claims for asylum or nonrefoulement heard. The
language of Article 184 and Article 3385 logically implies that the
United States cannot evade its duty by not individually hearing asy-
lum claims of people at its borders.86 On the other hand, the sheer
number of people reaching the border and requesting asylum out-
stripped the ability of the United States to individually consider asy-
lum claims.8 7 As a result, the United States resorted to two
questionable practices arguably contravening the letter and the spirit
of the Convention: mass prejudgment of refugee and asylum claims
and routine detention of asylum seekers.
1. Mass Prejudgment
Article 33 implicitly allows a state to return any person not qual-
ifying as a refugee.88 The United States chose to prejudge groups of
82. See, e.g., DePalma, "U.S. May Accept Some Chinese Stranded on Vessels Off
Mexico," N.Y Times, July 16, 1993, at Al; Rosenthal, "The U.S. Smashes a Peril,"
N.Y Times, July 20, 1993, at A15.
83. China has fined or imprisoned illegal migrants repatriated to China, leading
to charges that this amounted to persecution. Schmetzer, "Fleeing Chinese Peasants:
Pressure on America?," Chicago Tribune, June 27, 1993, sec. 1, at 19.
84. Because the term "refugee" applies to a person, not a group, under Article 1,
determinations of refugee status would have to evaluate individual cases, not group
cases. See Convention, supra n. 2, at Art. 1.
85. Returning groups of people without individualized determination would risk
return of legitimate individual refugees; a person becomes a refugee upon satisfying
the definition, not when a state recognizes the refugee. See Convention, supra n. 2, at
Art. 33; Handbook, supra n. 32, § 28 ("Recognition of his refugee status does not
therefore make him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a refu-
gee because of recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee.").
86. Goodwin-Gill, supra n. 80, at 18-19.
87. The United States assumed at the time of passage of the Refugee Act that
admission of 5,000 people annually through asylum would prove generous, even
though backlogs existing at the time made that expectation unrealistic even then.
Loescher & Scanlan, supra n. 8, at 180.
88. Hailbronner, "Non-Refoulement and 'Humanitarian' Refugees: Customary
International Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?," 26 Va. J. Int'l L. 857 (1986). One
limited exception has arisen recently with the adoption of the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A.
Res. 39/46 Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 511 at 198), U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
Article 3 of that document enjoins states from returning any person if "substantial
grounds" suggest that the person would be subject to "torture", an act of "severe pain
or suffering" under Article 1.
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applicants in order to expeditiously evaluate the merits of a claim of
refugee status and return those judged to have insufficient evidence
of persecution or risk of persecution. Mass prejudgment of any sort
proves troublesome enough,8 9 and it becomes even more troublesome
when coupled with blatant discrimination. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS) officials in Florida refused to return Nicara-
guan asylum applicants on account of potential persecution at the
hands of the Sandinistas, 90 a decision backed up by the Attorney
General. 91 Asylum applicants from other countries (primarily Haiti,
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras), though, did not similarly
benefit from mass treatment; rather, the United States engaged in a
desperate quest to reject as many applicants from this region as pos-
sible. 92 Applicants for refugee status from these countries fared no
better; under the priority system employed by the United States
within its regional ceilings for refugee admissions, countries not of
foreign policy concern to the United States have not received designa-
tion, thus representing another mass prejudgment. 93
2. Detention of Asylum Seekers
Article 31 of the Convention requires that countries not detain
asylum seekers unless investigatory purposes or a chance of disap-
pearance or harm to public order. compels detention of an individ-
ual. 94 In an ad hoc response to 125,000 fleeing Cubans in 1980,
however, the United States indefinitely detained Cubans deemed
dangerous, which generated fierce controversy. 95 When subse-
quently faced with large numbers of Haitians seeking asylum, the
United States decided to detain the Haitians without bond. 96 The
purpose centered not on national security but on deterrence of asy-
lum seekers, even though Haitians represented fewer than two per-
cent of the people entering the United States illegally.97 Further, the
89. Compare Goodwin-Gill, "Non-Refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers," 26
Va. J. Int'l L. 897, 901-02 (1986), with Hailbronner, supra n. 88, at 866-67, 880.
90. Zucker & Zucker, supra n. 8, at 93.
91. See infra n. 225 for the reaction of Attorney General Meese to the Nicaraguan
migration.
92. This quest inevitably ended in the interdiction of asylum seekers from Haiti
with little or no screening. See supra nn. 66-83 and accompanying text.
93. See infra nn. 128-131 and accompanying text.
94. Convention, supra n. 2, at Art. 31(1) ("The Contracting States shall not im-
pose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees ... provided
they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for
their illegal entry or presence."); id. at Art. 31(2) ("The Contracting States shall not
apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those which are nec-
essary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the country is
regularized....").
95. See generally Helton, "The Legality of Detaining Refugees in the United
States," 14 N.Y U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 353 (1986).
96. Zucker & Zucker, supra n. 8, at 179-80.
97. Id. at 163.
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United States carefully detained Haitians in places where pursuit of
asylum claims would prove virtually impossible due to the lack of
counsel or interpreters. 98 This led to a ruling by the Supreme Court
that the INS had violated its own regulations prohibiting discrimina-
tion in the application of detention.99 The detention policy eventually
extended to all asylum seekers, but still primarily focused on Latin
Americans and never included applicants from eastern Europe. 00
In a case centering on detention of asylum seekers from El Salva-
dor, a court detailed systematic abuses of those detained during the
early 1980s. 101 For instance, INS officials, contrary to stated INS
policy, used threats, misrepresentations, subterfuges, and other
forms of coercion in attempting to convince Salvadorans to sign vol-
untary departure forms, even when they expressed an unequivocal
fear of return. Also, the agents denied the Salvadorans' right to coun-
sel on many occasions, either directly or by holding the Salvadorans
in remote locations, and by maintaining highly inaccurate lists of
agencies providing legal assistance. Finally, INS officials placed a
higher burden of proof on Salvadoran asylum applicants, due to their
prejudgment that the Salvadorans' claims lacked merit. 102
The case of the Haitian refugees detained indefinitely at the
United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay because they had
tested positive for HIV10 3 represents the most recent and well-publi-
cized incident of detention. Congress has barred immigrants with
HIV from entry to the United States, but not refugees with the same
problem. The law provides that a refugee with an excludable medical
condition can receive admission "for humanitarian purposes, to as-
sure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest."1 4
The United States had never tested any other country's asylum seek-
ers for HIV, creating a presumption that the exemption would ap-
ply.' 05 At the request of other countries willing to accept refugees
from Haiti in the wake of the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand
98. Id. at 201.
99. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). The ruling represented the only non-
employment case where the federal government was found to have discriminated on
the basis of race or national origin. Little, "United States Haitian Policy: A History of
Discrimination," 10 N.YL. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 269, 280 (1993). The UNHCR had also
suggested that the detention policy violated the Protocol. Helton, supra n. 95, at 358.
100. Loescher & Scanlan, supra n. 8, at 193; Zucker & Zucker, supra n. 8, at 205.
101. Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988), affd sub
nom., Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990).
102. Id.
103. Haitian Centers Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (hereinaf-
ter Sale II). 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(I) (Supp. IV 1992), the statute in force at the
time of the case, made persons with "a communicable disease of public health signifi-
cance" excludable. Congress amended the law in 1993 to expressly cover AIDS vic-
tims. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(A)(1)(A)(I) (West Supp. 1994).
104. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3) (1988).
105. Sale II, 823 F. Supp. at 1048.
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Aristide, 10 6 however, U.S. officials tested the Haitians at Guanta-
namo Bay for HIV. Those who had passed the prescreening for refu-
gee status but had tested positive for HIV remained at Guantanamo.
As the court pointed out, this not only relegated the Haitians to live
in squalid conditions, 10 7 it presented a health threat since the Guan-
tanamo base lacked the proper facilities and personnel to properly
handle people with HIV 0 8 and by holding all of the Haitians with
HIV in one place, had one of them contracted a contagious life-threat-
ening disease of some sort, the disease could easily have spread
through the entire camp. 10 9 The court ruled that any detained per-
son has a due process right to governmental conduct that did not be-
come "deliberately indifferent to the personal needs of non-convicted
detainees," 110 and that this detention constituted deliberate indiffer-
ence to the health of the Haitians. 1 ' Also, the court disallowed the
use of the ban on people with communicable diseases to Haitians
with HIV; because the law did not receive strict enforcement, enforc-
ing the ban against the Haitians constituted discrimination." 2
While the court have sustained challenges to detention policies,
questionable detention policies continue, particularly with regard to
Haitians who reach the United States. The Haitians remain de-
tained in rural facilities, 113 with troublesome transfer policies, 114 ob-
solete lists of available counsel, 115 and a high degree of abuse that
the government has delayed in resolving. 116 While the United States
indefinitely detains Haitians in Florida, the Cuban who recently emi-
grated to the United States by way of a daring flight only faced 48
hours of detention in the same facility. 11 7 By detaining classes of
asylum seekers without individual demonstrations of investigatory
purposes, risk of disappearance, or a risk to security, the detention
policies remain in tension with Article 31 of the Convention. The use
of detention to deter Latin American asylum seekers also impacts on
the rule against discrimination in Article 3 of the Convention.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 1037 for a poignant description of the condition of the camp.
108. Id. at 1038.
109. Id. at 1039.
110. Id. at 1044.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1048.
113. "Haitians Suffer from Isolation in Rural Jails," N.Y. Times, June 28, 1993, at
A8.
114. Little, supra n. 99, at 279.
115. Id. at 284.
116. Id. at 284-85.
117. Id. at 289.
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D. Procedures for Determining Refugee Status and Asylum
Procedurally, states must enact sufficient procedures to fulfill
their obligations to genuine refugees. 118 The Convention leaves the
specific procedural details, however, to the states."l 9 Indeed, apart
from the limitation on restricting the free movement of people with
pending claims 120 and perhaps the need for the procedures to main-
tain independence from general immigration law,121 states retain a
free hand so long as the procedures conform to the general good faith
requirement.1 22 These limitations form the backdrop for an analysis
of the procedures both for admitting refugees overseas and for recog-
nizing as refugees and granting asylum to persons inside the country
or at the borders.
1. Refugee Status Procedures
Under the Refugee Act, the United States has separate proce-
dures for evaluating claims for refugee status from outside the
United States and for evaluating asylum claims inside the United
States. The refugee admissions program starts from the designation
of ceilings for admission from each region of the world. The President
proposes the ceilings, and, after consultation, Congress establishes
the ceilings, usually following the recommendations of the President.
As the numbers presented later will attest, the total ceilings reflect a
commitment to admit a significant share of the world's refugees.' 23
The numbers also indicate, though, that the use of regional ceilings
within the overall ceiling results in a structure where refugees from
certain regions enjoy an unfair procedural advantage over refugees
from other regions. 124 This raises questions about whether the use of
regional ceilings complies with the nondiscrimination mandate of Ar-
ticle 3 of the Convention.
In addition to the regional ceilings themselves, the United States
favors refugees from certain countries within these regions as well.
Refugees must typically interview with INS officials at designated lo-
cations. The INS currently maintains field offices in Mexico City,
118. See Handbook, supra n. 32, § 189 ("It is obvious that, to enable States parties
to the Convention and to the Protocol to implement their provisions, refugees have to
be identified.").
119. See id. ("It is ... left to each Contracting State to establish the procedure that
it considers most appropriate, having regard to its particular constitutional and ad-
ministrative structure.").
120. Convention, supra n. 2, at Art. 31.
121. Goodwin-Gill, supra n. 80, at 148.
122. 1 Grahl-Madsen, supra n. 79, § 125. The Handbook recommends that states
use systematic procedures administered by qualified, experienced personnel with ex-
plicit instructions and should allow the person to fully present the case and to consult
the UNHCR office, but even those recommendations do not bind states. Handbook,
supra n. 32, §§ 190, 192.
123. See infra nn. 208-210 and accompanying text.
124. See infra nn. 211-221 and accompanying text.
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Moscow, Rome, Vienna, Frankfurt, Athens, Nairobi, New Delhi,
Bangkok, Singapore, and Hong Kong, and officials make "circuit
rides" to conduct interviews at other designated ports. 125 These loca-
tions place a heavy burden on applicants from disfavored regions,
who must travel a great distance to reach a processing center. 126
More importantly, the United States processes refugees according to
a system of priorities. The six priorities, in descending order, include:
(1) "exceptional cases" either of refugees in immediate danger of
death or of compelling concern to the U.S., (2) former U.S. govern-
ment employees, (3) family unification, (4) other ties to the U.S., (5)
more distant family relations, and (6) those with no ties with the U.S.
but who are otherwise of national interest.127 Except for situations
where a refugee's life faces immediate danger, the United States
must specify the country within a region before it will accept any ref-
ugees from that country under the regional ceiling.128 The countries
specifically singled out in 1992 included: from Africa, Liberia, Ethio-
pia, Somalia, and Sudan; from East Asia, Laos and Vietnam; from
Eastern Europe, Romania and Albania; from Latin America, Cuba
and Haiti; and from the Near East, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. 129
This indicates that the United States will admit refugees of lower
priorities from countries it disapproves of (Somalia, Iraq, Cuba) or
has special commitments to (Laos, Vietnam) at the expense of appli-
cants from other countries where similar persecution may exist.
Some observers have concluded that the priority system has not re-
ceived sufficient congressional scrutiny, and has helped further dis-
criminatory implementation of the Refugee Act. 130
2. Asylum Procedures
A person may either file for asylum independently or may file
when the INS commences deportation or exclusion proceedings.
When a person in the United States or at the border applies for asy-
lum or withholding of deportation, the claim goes before a member of
the corps of Asylum Officers, a division of the INS Office of Refugees,
125. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Refugee Programs, World Refugee Re-
port 168 (1992).
126. Zucker & Zucker, supra n. 8, at 85. Regulations provide that if the distance
proves too impracticable for the applicant, the person may apply preliminarily at the
designated consular office. 8 C.F.R. § 207.1(a) (1993).
127. Robinson & Frelick, "Lives in the Balance: The Political and Humanitarian
Impulses in U.S. Refugee Policy," 1990 Int'l J. Refugee L. 293, 300 (special issue).
128. A further breakdown of priority designations for fiscal year 1993 appears in
Refugee Reports, Dec. 31, 1992, at 6.
129. Administration's Proposed Refugee Admissions Program for Fiscal Year
1993: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration and Ref-
ugees of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess. 10-16 (1992)
(statement of Jewel Lafontant-Mankarious, Ambassador-at-Large and U.S. Coordina-
tor for Refugee Affairs, Department of State).
130. See, e.g., Zucker & Zucker, supra n. 8, at 81.
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Asylum, and Parole. 131 Asylum officers interview every applicant for
asylum.' 3 2 The officer must engage in a nonadversarial interview,
and in privacy if the applicant so requests. 133 Through the interview,
the Asylum Officer seeks to "elicit all relevant and useful informa-
tion"i' 4 about the applicant, in accordance with the Handbook stan-
dard that "the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is
shared between the applicant and the examiner." 3 5 The applicant
has a right to have counsel present and to present affidavits and wit-
nesses. 136 The applicant may submit other corroborating evidence
for thirty days after the interview. 137 The Bureau of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA) of the State Department may
contribute to the record considered by the Asylum Officer; the appli-
cant must receive all nonclassified information the BHRHA provides
and have the opportunity to respond.'3 8
If an asylum application arises in the context of a deportation or
an exclusion hearing, an Immigration Judge, one of the people the
Attorney General has designated to handle immigration claims, has
exclusive jurisdiction.' 3 9 An applicant rejected by an Asylum Officer
may renew the application before the Immigration Judge once a de-
portation or exclusion hearing commences. 140 The Immigration
Judge reaches a decision using the same standards as Asylum Of-
ficers, but may first conduct an adversarial evidentiary hearing to
resolve factual matters.141 The applicant has a right of appeal to the
Attorney General; the Attorney General has created the Board of Im-
migration Appeals (BIA) as the appeal mechanism and appoints its
131. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1(b), 208.2(a) (1993).
132. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(a) (1993).
133. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (1993).
134. Id.
135. Handbook, supra n. 32, § 196. One commentator argues that the U.S. lan-
guage proves "profoundly different" from the Handbook standards. Robinson, "A Par-
adox of Asylum Law - The More Due Process, the Harder the Case," 28 Willamette L.
Rev. 833, 838 (1992). A fair definition of the word "elicit", though, suggests that the
Asylum Officer should do more than serve as a "receptacle for the applicant's evi-
dence". Any problems, then, would flow from implementation, not regulatory authori-
zation. For an analysis of the performance of Asylum Officers, see National Asylum
Study Project, Excerpts from the National Asylum Study Project's Interim Assess-
ment of the Asylum Process of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (1992), in
Asylum and Inspections Reform: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International
Law, Immigration, and Refugees of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 384-85 (1993) (hereinafter Asylum and Inspections Reform).
136. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (1993).
137. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(e) (1993).
138. 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (1993).
139. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (1993).
140. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(b) (1993).
141. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c)(4) (1993); see Robinson, supra n. 136, at 841. The more
adversarial nature in comparison to the interview by the Asylum Officer undoubtedly
reflects a prejudgment about applicants who have either waited until a deportation or
exclusion hearing to file for asylum or who did not receive approval from an Asylum
Officer.
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members. 142 In a deportation case, appeal beyond the BIA goes di-
rectly to a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals; in an exclusion case, the
applicant may file for habeas corpus relief in a Federal District
Court.14 3
In evaluating the claim, the Department of Justice has estab-
lished the following standard of review:
[T~he Asylum Officer or Immigration Judge shall not require
the applicant to provide evidence that he would be singled
out individually for persecution if: (A) He establishes that
there is a pattern or practice in his country of nationality or
last habitual residence of persecution of groups of persons
similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion; and (B) He establishes his own inclusion in
and identification with such group of persons such that his
fear of persecution upon return is reasonable. 4 4
In accordance with the asylum statute, an asylum applicant need
only provide a "reasonable basis" of proof of refugee status to become
eligible for discretionary asylum; 45 appellate courts will only reverse
a factual determination if no reasonable factfinder could have decided
as it did.' 46 The Attorney General can refuse to exercise this discre-
tion, but must exercise favorable discretion "in the absence of any
adverse factors."147 If a court finds such factors, though, an appeals
court can only reverse a discretionary denial if an abuse of discretion
occurred.148 The Asylum Officer or Immigration Judge must reject
claims for asylum or withholding of deportation if the evidence indi-
cates that the applicant persecuted others in the country, has a con-
viction for a particularly serious crime and represents a danger to the
community, or reasonably presents a danger to the national secur-
ity. 149 In accordance with the nonrefoulement statute, the applicant
142. See Ira J. Kurzban, Kurzban's Immigration Law Sourcebook 204-05, 227 (3d
ed. 1992); Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff & David A. Martin, Immigration: Process and
Policy 111-12 (2d ed. 1991).
143. Id.
144. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i) (1993). But see Refugee Reports, Oct. 29, 1993, at
12 (full National Asylum Study Project report concluded over 50% of Asylum Officers
required singling out in violation of regulations).
145. The Supreme Court settled on the "reasonable basis" test in INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
146. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
147. Matter of Pula, 19 I & N Dec. 467 (BIA 1987).
148. Rojas v. INS, 937 F.2d 186, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1991).
149. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(c), 208.14(c), 208.16(c) (1993). Appeals courts have re-
cently affirmed those mandatory exclusion provisions in the context of nonrefoule-
ment for an applicant convicted of an aggravated felony. See, e.g., Mosquera-Perez v.
INS, 3 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 1993). The BIA could invoke the security grounds to exclude
Omar Abdel-Rahman, connected to various terrorist activities abroad and later impli-
cated in the World Trade Center bombing, without abusing its discretion. Ali v. Reno,
829 F. Supp. 1415 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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must demonstrate a clear probability of persecution in order to re-
ceive nonrefoulement, 150 and once again appellate courts will only re-
verse if no reasonable factfinder would have decided as it did.' 5 ' The
Attorney General has no discretion, however, to deport to the country
of persecution once the applicant gains eligibility under the
statute.152
The crucial procedural controversy involves the role of the State
Department in the process. Diplomats and desk officers who compile
the BHRHA reports, understandably influenced by foreign relations
concerns, will play down persecution in countries the U.S. wishes to
maintain good relations with and play up persecution elsewhere.15 3
As a result, asylum decisions exhibit this bias because Asylum Of-
ficers and courts almost always follow the State Department determi-
nations. In fact, 96% of cases decided by Asylum Officers conformed
to the State Department opinion,' 54 and a study of Immigration
Judge rulings also found great deference to the opinions of the State
Department. 15,5
In an effort to decrease this foreign policy influence in decision-
making, regulations now direct the INS to gather information from
other "credible sources, such as international organizations, private
voluntary agencies, or academic institutions," 56 "disseminate to Asy-
lum Officers information on persecution of persons in other coun-
tries,"1 57 and to "maintain a documentation center with information
150. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 440-41 (1984).
151. See supra n. 147.
152. See supra n. 151.
153. Sexton, "Political Refugees, Nonrefoulement and State Practice: A Compara-
tive Study," 18 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 731, 756 (1985).
154. Ignatius, "Haitian Asylum Seekers: Their Treatment as a Measure of the
I.N.S. Asylum Officer Corps," 7 Geo. Imm. L.J. 119, 123 (1993), quoting GAO, Asylum:
Uniform Applications of Standards Uncertain - Few Denied Applicants Deported
(1987).
155. Anker, "Determining Asylum Claims in the United States," 2 Int'l J. Refugee
L. 252, 258 (1990). For statistical analysis of asylum adjudications and further illus-
tration of a foreign policy bias in the process, see infra nn. 222-231 and accompanying
text. This should not suggest that some courts do not comprehend the biases of the
State Department and react accordingly. For instance, the court in Zacarias v. INS,
921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
112 S. Ct. 812 (1992), placed even greater emphasis on a State Department letter and
country report of political persecution in Guatemala because the United States had
good relations with Guatemala and the State Department accordingly had an incen-
tive to downplay political persecution occurring there. A few courts, citing the desire
of the Refugee Act to abolish discrimination in the asylum process, have questioned
any use of information from those responsible for foreign policy when considering dis-
cretionary denials of asylum. See Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1121 (2nd Cir.
1990), rev'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992), where the appeals court said the
U.S. interest in good relations with England should not have affected the determina-
tion of whether a person's request to be deported to Ireland should have received
approval.
156. 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (1993).
157. 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(c) (1993).
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on human rights conditions."158 The INS has begun to compile the
nongovernmental information through use of "master exhibits" on
specific subpopulations of people subject to persecution, so that par-
ties wishing to use nongovernmental documents have a ready refer-
ence. 159 The applicant must receive any information the Asylum
Officer relies upon and have a chance to rebut the information. 160
The injection of information from other sources, though, may not
have much effect on bias toward official governmental findings. 161 A
study of Immigration Judges found that they routinely ignored data
from nongovernmental sources. 16 2 In. fact, one appellate court has
gone so far as to say that it would not consider reports of human
rights abuses from any source other than the U.S. government or the
U.N., saying it could not adequately gauge the motivations of the peo-
ple drawing up the other reports. 163 This court stated that even
though the official sources may suffer from political bias, the judici-
ary has little ability to weigh the accuracy of the official assessments,
so it cannot legitimately challenge them.' 64 For the most part, then,
the State Department has retained an important role in the asylum
procedure.
E. Substantive Refugee Status and Asylum Determinations
Substantively, states incur an obligation under the Convention
to confer refugee status on people they decide meet the Convention
criteria. States, however, retain discretion to determine whether the
person falls under the Convention or not, provided that they interpret
the Convention in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory way. The
1980 Refugee Act has adopted the Convention definition of "refu-
gee". 165 Determination of how the United States has chosen to inter-
158. Id.
159. 58 Fed. Reg. 26165 (1993).
160. 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (1993).
161. A preliminary assessment by the National Asylum Study Project of the new
Asylum Officer corps found that many officers denied applications using State De-
partment information contradicting more recent and reliable evidence. National Asy-
lum Study Project, "Excerpts from the National Asylum Study Project's Interim
Assessment of the Asylum Process of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(1992)," in, Asylum and Inspections Reform, supra n. 136, at 384-85. Perhaps in re-
sponse to this reflexive reliance on the State Department opinions, a bill currently
before Congress proposes to do away with individual State Department opinions alto-
gether. H.R. 3363, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1993).
162. Anker, supra n. 156, at 257.
163. M.A. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 313 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc). Despite the new
asylum regulations, appeals court judges still routinely rely on State Department
judgments. See, e.g., Khano v. INS, 999 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1993) (State Department
opinion that Syrian Christians not subject to religious persecution relied on); Yacoub
v. INS, 999 F.2d 1296, 1298 (8th Cir. 1993) (State Department opinion that Egyptian
Christians not subject to religious persecution relied on). For a potential congres-
sional response to this reliance, see supra n. 162.
164. M.A., 899 F.2d at 313.
165. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
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pret the Convention definition involves examining judicial review of
refugee decisions. Courts, especially the Supreme Court, have chosen
to interpret the Convention more restrictively in recent years,
thereby providing the executive branch with legal authority to limit
obligations under the Convention.
1. Well-Founded Fear
The Handbook elaborates a two-part test - subjective and objec-
tive - for judging when a fear proves "well-founded". 166 United States
courts have generally followed this pattern of evaluating the fear of a
potential refugee.167 Subjectively, the applicant must demonstrate a
genuine fear of persecution, which brings claims of credibility into
question. Although in the large majority of cases courts find enough
of a subjective fear to require a complete consideration of the objectiv-
ity of the fear, if courts doubt the genuineness of the fear, they will
deny the application without bothering to make a detailed evalua-
tion of the objective merits of the case. 168 Objectively, the applicant
must present specific facts which can prove that a reasonable person
in the applicant's person would fear persecution. 169
2. Persecution
A person fleeing danger in a country does not necessarily run
from the type of danger called "persecution". International bodies
and theorists have espoused widely disparate explanations of what
constitutes persecution. 170 The Handbook states that the Convention
envisioned that "a threat to life or freedom" or "other serious viola-
tions of human rights" would amount to persecution. 171 United
166. Handbook, supra n. 32, §§ 37-38.
167. See Cuadras v. INS, 910 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1990); Balazoski v. INS, 932 F.2d
638 (7th Cir. 1991); Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1992); Huaman-Cornelio
v. BIA, 979 F.2d 995 (4th Cir. 1992); Alsheweikh v. INS, 990 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir.
1993).
168. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1000 (9th Cir. 1988) (Salva-
doran who lived in El Salvador 6 months later than time of alleged persecution); Alva-
rez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1990) (Salvadoran who lived in El Salvador 4
years after time of alleged persecution); Castillo v. INS, 951 F.2d 1147 (9th Cir. 1991)
(Nicaraguan who lived in Nicaragua 5 1/2 years after time of alleged persecution);
Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 955 F.2d 1251, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 1992) (Nicaraguan who
transformed initial claim of one incident of interrogation into a tale of threats, beat-
ings with injuries, 6 to 7 arrests, and 3 detentions). These cases indicate that the
subjective test of well-founded fear has more vitality than some analysts have sug-
gested. For arguments for a purely objective test, see 1 Grahl-Madsen, supra n. 79,
§ 76; Hathaway, supra n. 61, at 65-67.
169. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I & N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
170. See Goodwin-Gill, supra n. 80, at 39 (life or freedom plus other rights, de-
pending on the seriousness of the violation, the nature of the restriction, and the con-
nection between the restriction and a rights deprivation); Hathaway, supra n. 61, at
109-117 (four-tier test for persecution based on rights derived from international
covenants).
171. Handbook, supra n. 32, § 51.
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States courts have come far short of establishing such a thorough the-
oretical construct, naturally preferring to consider the problem more
narrowly in the context of individual cases. Courts concur that any
significant curtailment of life or freedom will amount to persecution.
Courts have ruled, though, that short-term detention by totalitarian
regimes did not constitute persecution; 172 only when imprisonment
stretched for a period of several months had the detention surpassed
the threshold for persecution. 173 Also, punishment of crime will not
amount to persecution unless the punishment flowed from an "im-
proper governmental motive".174 Enforcement of military conscrip-
tion will not qualify either unless the enforcement becomes
"disproportionately severe" or the conscription requested proves "con-
trary to the basic rules of human conduct." 175
The Supreme Court has hinted that persecution would represent
a "seemingly broader concept" than "life or freedom".176 A few lower
courts have concurred, embracing a broad concept of persecution.
One extended the definition to "punishment ... that any country does
not recognize as legitimate."177 Another summed up relevant prece-
dent and concluded that harm alone would suffice. 178 Generally,
however, courts have required a substantial degree of harm before
they have classified the harm as "persecution". For instance, eco-
nomic deprivation will constitute persecution only if it resulted from
a governmental act specifically aimed at the person or group and the
deprivation sharply curtails the ability to earn a livelihood. 179 And
although various groups may persecute (the authorities, other sup-
172. See Kubon v. INS, 913 F.2d 380, 388 (7th Cir. 1990) ("brief confinement for
political opposition to a totalitarian regime does not necessarily constitute persecu-
tion"); Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1990) (detention for short time
with no mistreatment not necessarily persecution).
173. Osaghae v. INS, 942 F.2d 1160, 1163 (7th Cir. 1991) (Nigerian with record of
political opposition imprisoned for several months).
174. See Mabugah v. INS, 937 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1991), where a Filipino faced
charges initiated by the Marcos regime of misappropriating corporation funds to a
political party. The court ruled that since the Aquino government had continued the
prosecution, the prosecution in all likelihood stemmed from no improper motive. See
generally Handbook, supra n. 32, § 56 (punishment for crime not in and of itself
persecution).
175. Handbook, supra n. 32, §§ 169, 171. This means that the government must
know of the person's belief and structure the military request and punishment accord-
ingly. Alonzo v. INS, 915 F.2d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1990). One court recently found a
conscription request to violate these standards when a Salvadoran had received a
command to participate in an assassination or possibly face death himself. Barraza-
Rivera v. INS, 913 F.2d 1443, 1452 (9th Cir. 1990).
176. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984).
177. Osaghae, 942 F.2d at 1163.
178. Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986).
179. See Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir. 1988) (Haitian driven into
hiding by threats on life severely impaired in ability to earn livelihood and perse-
cuted); Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1990) (Polish person fired by
government and restricted from acquiring more land could still earn substantially the
same living and insufficiently deprived for persecution).
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porters of the regime, the military, the government, and other groups
the government proves "unable or unwilling to control"), 180 if the gov-
ernment has the will and the ability to protect an individual, harm
inflicted by another group will not constitute "persecution".181
An examination of these decisions indicates, then, that while the
United States may not have engaged in a frontal assault on the Con-
vention conception of "persecution", its courts have nibbled at the
edges through strict interpretations of the term in some cases.
3. Civil or Political Status
Even if a person faces persecution, the persecution must have
occurred (or must occur in the future) "on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group." 182 This has
proven increasingly unavailing for modern-day victims of generalized
violence, who cannot prove individualized or group-specific persecu-
tion.'8 3 United States courts have zealously labored to keep refugee
status within the narrow bounds of civil or political status delineated
in the Refugee Act. A recent Supreme Court decision, INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, confirms an ominous trend by U.S. courts to require an
even stronger connection than formerly required between the perse-
cution and one of the five enumerated grounds.'8 4 The Court,
through an opinion written by Justice Scalia, ruled that in order to
demonstrate persecution on account of the political opinion of neu-
trality, the applicant must prove that the persecutors wished to pun-
ish the neutrality and must not have had any other purpose for their
persecution.I8 5 It also noted that the victim must prove that the per-
secution occurred on account of the victim's political opinion, not the
political opinion of the persecutor. ' 8 6 The ruling prompted a dissent-
ing opinion which remarked that "the narrow, grudging construction
180. Adebisi v. INS, 952 F.2d 910, 913-14 (5th Cir. 1992).
181. Id. at 914.
182. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
183. Gunning, "Expanding the International Definition of Refugee: A Multicul-
tural View," 13 Fordham Int'l L.J. 35, 58 (1990).
184. 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992). The case involved an 18-year-old Guatemalan who was
asked by armed, uniformed, and masked guerrillas to join their forces and had re-
fused. When they promised to return, he fled, fearing either persecution by the guer-
rillas for refusing to join or retaliation by the government if he joined the guerrillas.
After reaching the United States, the guerrillas had returned to his home to look for
him on two occasions.
185. Id. at 816-17. This does not require, however, an affirmative statement of
belief by the victim; even when an applicant lied to potential persecutors about the
applicant's political opinion, the applicant may have the ability to prove persecution
on account of political opinion. Rivas-Martinez v. INS, 997 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir.
1993).
186. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 816 ("If a Nazi regime persecutes Jews, it is not,
within the ordinary meaning of language, engaging in persecution on account of polit-
ical opinion; and if a fundamentalist Moslem regime persecutes democrats, it is not
engaging in persecution on account of religion.").
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of the concept of 'political opinion'" proved inconsistent with a more
liberal ruling regarding likelihood of persecution issued five years
earlier by the Court. 18 7
An examination of recent case law reveals that courts have in-
deed applied this "narrow, grudging construction" in cases involving
all five enumerated grounds. One court held that as long as a govern-
ment cooperates with members of other races and nationalities, the
court would presume that the government punishes members of a
particular minority race or nationality for legitimate reasons and
thus has not persecuted an individual applicant on account of race or
nationality. 88  Regarding religion, if a government has the will and
capability to prosecute groups that persecute people on the basis of
religion, the persecuted people cannot claim refugee status. 89 Simi-
larly, if the government persecutes but has non-religious motivations
for its actions, courts will not find persecution on account of reli-
gion.' 90 Courts have interpreted "particular social group" rather nar-
rowly, and rejected most claims to membership in a particular social
group.' 91 Finally, the Supreme Court decision itself exhibits the nar-
row interpretation now given to "political opinion".' 92
187. Id. at 818 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote the majority opin-
ion in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), the case he referred to. Cardoza-
Fonseca held that "well-founded fear" as set out in the Refugee Act did not require
that a person more likely than not prove such fear; Justice Stevens argued that the
lower standard required a more lenient evaluation of whether'a refusal to join the
armed forces constituted a political opinion. Id. at 818-19.
188. Matter of T-, Interim Decision No. 3187 (BIA 1992) (Tamil in Sri Lanka not
subject to persecution on account of "ethnicity" because the Sri Lankan government
cooperated militarily and politically with other Tamil groups).
189. See Elnager v. INS, 930 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1991) (Christian in Egypt not
subject to persecution on account of religion because government did not persecute on
account of religion, would provide an adequate remedy for any harm, and would pro-
tect him from radical groups who would persecute him on account of religion).
190. See Matter of R-, Interim Decision No. 3195 (BIA 1992) (Sikh in Punjab re-
gion of India persecuted by policemen to obtain names of members of guerrilla group,
so not persecuted on account of religious beliefs); Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599,
601 (9th Cir. 1992) (conscientious objector not subject of religious persecution when
conscripted unless government knew of religious belief and required military service
anyway). But see Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1992) (since Iranian
religious law prescribes death for belief in Christianity, Christian subject to religious
persecution despite "low profile" of belief).
191. For examples of subpopulations ruled not to constitute a "particular social
group," see, e.g., Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1577 (9th Cir. 1986) (young,
working class, urban males); DeValle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 793 (9th Cir. 1990) (fami-
lies of different deserters); Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 925 F.2d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir.
1991) (military membership); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2nd Cir. 1991) (young wo-
men on grounds that they represented targets of rape); Saleh v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
962 F.2d 234, 240 (2nd Cir. 1992) (expatriated or poor Yemeni Moslems); Ravindran
v. INS, 976 F.2d 754, 761 (1st Cir. 1992) (Tamil males 15 to 45); Bastanipour, 980
F.2d at 1132 (Iranian drug traffickers). Contra Matter of Toboro No. A23 220 644
(BIA Mar. 12, 1990) (homosexuals qualify); Gebremichael v. INS, 1993 WL 473428
(1st Cir.) (families qualify); Zamora-Mutel v. INS, 905 F.2d 833, 838 (5th Cir. 1990)
(unions qualify).
192. See supra nn. 185-188 and accompanying text.
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In the end, however, the stricter scrutiny of whether persecution
occurred on account of one of the five enumerated categories illus-
trates less any lack of compliance with the Convention definition on
the part of the United States than the shortcomings of the Conven-
tion definition itself.
4. Cessation
Finally, if conditions in the country have changed to the extent
that the threat of persecution has effectively ceased, a person cannot
claim refugee status. 193 The coincidence of a large backlog of asylum
cases and the sudden end of the Cold War have transformed this pro-
vision into a welcome tool to limit asylum claims in recent years. The
Board of Immigration Appeals took "administrative notice" of the
political changes in many countries and denied asylum claims unless
the applicant could provide evidence indicating a fear of persecution
despite the new regimes.194 This has spawned several challenges to
the use of the general administrative notice. One challenge con-
cerned whether the generalized notice could serve as the exclusive
means for deciding a case. 195 Another dispute revolves around
whether the BIA must inform the applicant of its intent to take notice
of the change in conditions and provide an opportunity to respond to
the notice. 196 Another debate takes up the related question of
whether the potential to have a case reopened to respond to new evi-
193. Convention, supra n. 2, at Art 1(C)(5). U.S. law also allows termination of
asylum if the person no longer qualifies as a refugee as a result of changed conditions
in the previous country of residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (1988).
194. See, e.g., Kacmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
583 (1991). In Kacmarczyk, three asylum applicants had faced harassment by the
Polish government in the early 1980's due to their pro-Solidarity activities. Immigra-
tion Judges separately denied all three applications. The BIA separately affirmed the
three decisions in 1990, using the same notice of Solidarity's role in the Polish govern-
ment as of 1989 to rule that even if the applicants had possessed valid claims, their
refugee status would have ceased.
195. Courts have ruled that the BIA may use the general notice in more than one
individual case as long as it does not become the exclusive means of judging the mer-
its of a case. Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.,
Esquivel-Berrios v. INS, 113 S. Ct. 1943 (1993). If courts considered only the general
notice of change in conditions, this would contradict the duty under the Convention to
individually adjudicate asylum claims. See Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017,
1023 (9th Cir. 1992), where the court ruled that use of a completely generalized notice
in response to a Nicaraguan's claim that the change in government would not stop
future persecution does not provide a sufficient basis for cessation.
196. Compare Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 705-06 (10th Cir. 1991) (if the appli-
cant can reasonably anticipate that the BIA would bring the change of government
into consideration, no notice required), with Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1038-39 (if
the government seeks to take notice of issues resting on questionable assumptions,
such as assuming that the rise to power of Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua necessarily
meant that the Sandinistas could not persecute people with impunity, it must warn
the applicant and provide the opportunity to respond). The BIA recently interpreted
Castillo-Villagra to say that knowledge of new conditions and knowledge of the BIA's
ability to take notice suffices. Matter of H-M- et al., Interim Decision No. 3204 (BIA
1993).
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dence adequately protects an applicant when the BIA takes adminis-
trative notice without providing an opportunity to rebut the notice. 197
F. Rights Upon Resettlement
In contrast to the roadblocks barring initial acceptance as a refu-
gee, once a refugee settles in the United States, the U.S. takes great
pains to fulfill the obligations it incurs under the Convention with
regard to accepted refugees. 198 The refugees the United States ac-
cepts for resettlement become eligible for a wide array of services
under statute. Refugees qualify for employment, housing, education,
cash, food, and medical care programs. 199 The U.S. readily provides
such assistance because it wishes refugees to become self-sufficient
as soon as possible; thus, the overwhelming emphasis of the resettle-
ment statutes centers on providing employment for refugees. 200 In
fact, federal regulations require that if 55% or more of the eligible
refugees in a state receive cash and medical assistance (CMA), 85% of
the money provided to the states for refugee social services must go
toward employment services. 201 Statutes also place the burden on
U.S. officials to establish housing and education programs that pro-
vide refugees with fulfillment of these "basic needs".20 2 A refugee
may receive CMA if the refugee proves need and does not qualify for
assistance under other programs. 20 3 The U.S. may condition this
assistance on the participation of the refugee in a job search, includ-
ing acceptance of any "appropriate" job offer.204
The major question regarding these resettlement programs has
revolved around whether the amount of funding the federal govern-
ment provides for the programs adequately accounts for the needs of
refugees admitted by the federal government. This question, U.S. of-
ficials have discovered, involves a delicate balancing act. Once refu-
gees exhaust their eligibility under the refugee-specific programs,
197. Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1029-30 (BIA must grant motion to reopen if
notice taken without warning). See generally Frasher & Tran, Note, "Administrative
Notice in Political Asylum Appeals: Does the Motion to Reopen Preserve the Alien's
Due Process Rights?," 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 311 (1993).
198. Generally speaking, accepted refugees enjoy most of the rights of nationals of
the host country. See Convention, supra n. 2, at Arts. 4, 8, 13-28, 34 for these obliga-
tions. Voting rights represents a conspicuous exception, but a few advocates have
proposed that the U.S. grant the right to vote to certain aliens residing in the country.
Rosburg, "Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?," 75 Mich. L. Rev.
1092 (1977).
199. For an overview of this eligibility and a comparison to the eligibility of aliens
in general, see Kurzban, supra n. 143, at F-1.
200. The legislation authorizing resettlement programs stresses that "employable
refugees should be placed on jobs as soon as possible after their arrival in the United
States." 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(1)(B)(i) (1988).
201. 45 C.F.R. § 400.146(a) (1992).
202. 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(2)(C) (1988).
203. 8 U.S.C. § 1522(e)(1) (1988); 45 C.F.R. § 400.56 (1992).
204. 45 C.F.R. § 400.75(a) (1992).
1994] 603
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 42
they will receive general welfare benefits if necessary. If the govern-
ment gives refugees too much early assistance, the refugees will be-
come too dependent on receiving public assistance, meaning more
refugees will enter the welfare system and the indirect costs of admit-
ting refugees to the United States will increase.20 5 This belief, in
combination with budgetary restraints, has led the United States to
decrease the amount of money it devotes to refugee resettlement, rea-
soning that while refugees still receive enough assistance to facilitate
their entry, the cutbacks provide an added incentive to obtain em-
ployment as quickly as possible. Thus, in fiscal year 1986 the federal
government spent $6,629 per refugee in direct resettlement expendi-
tures, but by fiscal year 1990 that amount had decreased to $3,185,
and that level has remained fairly constant since then.20 6 While the
decreases have not yet reached dangerous levels, further decreases
would jeopardize the well-being of resettled refugees.
G. Statistical Analyses
Focusing on some of the statistical data released over the years
will help in evaluating whether the United States .has lived up to the
substantive promises of the Convention. In general, the figures
demonstrate that the United States has made a praiseworthy effort
to admit a substantial number of refugees over the years. From 1975
to 1990, the United States accepted 1,478,184 refugees, either
through the regular refugee program or through a grant of asylum. 20 7
This places the United States first by an enormous margin in terms
of total number of refugees admitted for resettlement, and fourth in
the world in terms of refugees resettled per capita. 20 8
In terms of sheer numbers, then, the United States has
shouldered its burden of accepting its share of the world's refu-
205. See David S. North, Refugee Earnings and Utilization of Financial Assistance
Programs 28-29, 37 (1984). This study evaluated the 1975 refugee influx from Indo-
china and found that the refugees left the welfare rolls only slowly over a period of
years, resulting in federal government expenditures of $706.3 million, only 27% of
which represented direct spending on refugee programs by the Office of Refugee
Resettlement.
206. The data used to make this assessment come from various sources. The
number of refugees admitted per year and the resettlement appropriations from fiscal
years 1986 through 1992 come from S. Rep. No. 316, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1992).
The refugee admissions numbers for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 come from the same
source, but reflected the allocated ceilings rather than actual admissions. The fiscal
year 1994 ceiling comes from 58 Fed. Reg. 52213 (1993). The fiscal year 1993 resettle-
ment appropriation combines the $381.5 million initial appropriation ("Congress
Gives Green(ish) Light to Private Resettlement Program; Implementation Set to Be-
gin in January," Refugee Reports, Oct. 1992, at 2) and the $27 million supplemental
appropriation (Pub. L. No. 103-37 (1993)). The fiscal year 1994 appropriation also
comes from Pub. L. No. 103-37 (1993).
207. U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey-1992, 36 (1992).
208. Id.
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gees. 20 9 Ironically, however, the large numbers have brought atten-
tion to the problem of discrimination in admissions levels. For
example, some analysts have wondered how the United States could
claim that admitting Haitian refugees would overburden it.210 Ex-
amining the statistics of refugee admissions and asylum acceptances
will bring U.S. compliance with Article 3 of the Convention into
question.
1. Refugee Status Approvals
Currently, 19.7 million people around the world have left their
homelands and either have status as refugees or have applied for
political asylum.211 Approximately 5.4 million of these refugees fled
African nations, 7.2 million fled Asia, primarily from Afghanistan
and Iraq, 883,000 fled from Central and South America, and 4.3 mil-
lion came from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, largely
from the former Yugoslavia. 212 Against this background, in fiscal
year 1994 the United States set a total ceiling of 120,000 for refugee
admissions.213 The U.S. set the ceiling for African admissions at
7,000; for the Near East, 6,000; for East Asia, 45,000; for Latin
America, 4,000; and for the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
55,000.214 The numbers suggest disproportionately low ceilings for
some regions, particularly Africa, and disproportionately high ceil-
ings for other regions, particularly East Asia and the former Soviet
Union.
These ceilings have combined with the priority system to trans-
form refugee admissions even more into a creature of U.S. foreign
policy.215 Only about 20,000 people from Africa have received ap-
209. A few scholars, though, have grumbled that the U.S. and other developed
countries could do much better. See, e.g., Peter & Renata Singer, "The Ethics of Refu-
gee Policy," in Mark Gibney (ed.), Open Borders? Closed Societies? The Ethical and
Political Issues 111, 128 (1988) ("It would not be difficult for the nations of the devel-
oped world to move closer to fulfilling their moral obligations to refugees. There is no
objective evidence to show that doubling their refugee intake would cause them any
harm whatsoever.").
210. Shacknove, "American Duties for Refugees: Their Scope and Limits," in Gib-
ney, supra n. 210, at 138.
211. These numbers come from the report recently published by UNHCR. "UN: 44
Million Refugees Fleeing Ethnic Wars," Chicago Tribune, Nov. 11, 1993, at A2; "U.N.
Report: Refugees Struggle Amid Racism," USA Today, Nov. 10, 1993, at 6A.
212. Id.
213. 58 Fed. Reg. 52213 (1993).
214. Id.
215. The figures in this paragraph represent compilations of data from fiscal years
1986 through 1992. The data for fiscal years 1986 through 1989 come from U.S. Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service 1986 at 41 (1987); U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 1987 at 49
(1988); U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service 1988 at 49 (1989); and U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization
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proval of applications for refugee status from fiscal years 1986 to
1992, and approximately two thirds of that total consists of appli-
cants from communist Ethiopia. The U.S. has accepted applications
from less than 14,000 Latin Americans, and virtually all accepted ap-
plications came from Cubans. Less than 50,000 refugee status ap-
provals came from the Near East, almost exclusively from
Afghanistan, Iran, and, in the wake of the Gulf War, Iraq. These
totals contrast with almost 250,000 acceptances each during that
time period from East Asia and the Soviet Union and close to 50,000
from Eastern Europe. To sum up, then, the United States approved
refugee applications from over 600,000 people from either communist
countries or other countries whose political systems the United
States disapproved of, while it accepted less than 5,000 refugees from
all other countries. 216 These numbers underscore how the refugee
admission process has in practice ignored the call of Article 3 and
worked primarily to benefit refugees from certain countries in-
dependent of the level of persecution refugees from each country have
suffered.217
Some explanations advanced to explain the discrepancy soften
this conclusion, while others do not. First, the estimated 2.5 million
Palestinian refugees from the Near East fall under a separate U.N.
refugee program and typically do not desire resettlement in a differ-
ent region. Second, more than 50% of the refugees specifically sin-
gled out by the UNHCR as needing resettlement do resettle in the
United States. 218 Third, the United States will often stress the supe-
riority of repatriation and regional solutions for refugees from distant
places such as Africa. The United States, however, has tended to use
this argument selectively, only emphasizing alternative solutions
when doing so buttresses its prejudgment not to admit refugees from
Service 1989 at 51 (1990). Data from fiscal years 1990 through 1992 come from INS
figures published in Refugee Reports, Dec. 21, 1990, at 13; Refugee Reports, Dec. 30,
1991, at 13; and Refugee Reports, Dec. 31, 1992, at 13.
216. For purposes of this calculation, countries designated as communist or of spe-
cial concern to the United States included all of the Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.,
Angola, Ethiopia, Hong Kong, China, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iran,
Syria, Iraq (only fiscal years 1991 and 1992), Libya, Cuba, and Nicaragua.
217. This result accords with the conclusion of a study finding no correlation be-
tween rights abuses in a country and chances of admission to the United States as a
refugee. Gibney et al., "USA Refugee Policy: A Human Rights Analysis Update," 5 J.
Refugee Stud. 33, 40-41 (1992).
218. Administration's Proposed Refugee Admissions Program for Fiscal Year
1993: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Ref-
ugees of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess. 42 (1992)
(statement of Warren Zimmerman, Director, Bureau of Refugee Programs, Depart-
ment of State). Recently, the United States has committed to accept approximately
10,000 Bosnians for admission under the refugee ceiling for the former Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. The UNHCR designated those Bosnians for resettlement due to
their status as former detainees, torture victims, or female victims of violence. Refu-
gee Reports, Sept. 30, 1993, at 5.
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the country.219 For instance, when ceilings proved higher than the
number of actual refugees from a region, the United States, when it
perceived a foreign policy benefit from admitting people from that re-
gion anyway, would accept people with spurious refugee claims in or-
der to fill the ceiling for that year.220
2. Asylum Decisions
The foreign policy emphasis in determining which asylum claims
the United States will encourage or discourage has inevitably re-
sulted in stark contrasts in asylum acceptance rates.221 Roughly 80
percent of persons granted asylum came from communist countries or
countries whose political systems the United States disapproved of,
although the majority of applicants came from other countries. This
disparity would have proven even greater had asylum adjudicators
not, at the behest of the State Department, toughened the standards
for those from Eastern Europe and Nicaragua in the wake of the
political changes there. 222 Had the United States not successfully
kept many cases from adjudication through detention or interdiction,
the gap would have swelled even further.223
The United States has attempted to make two explanations for
the distinction, neither of which proves satisfying. First, it has ar-
gued that applicants from communist nations fled "totalitarian"
countries, which it claimed persecuted to a greater extent that the
"authoritarian" countries most applicants came from.224 This argu-
ment betrays the foreign policy prism through which policymakers
219. Zucker & Zucker, supra n. 8, at 50.
220. Id. at 85, citing Weiss Fagen, "U.S. Refugee Admissions: Processing in Eu-
rope," 4 Migration News 3-4, 8-10 (1985). For instance, applicants from the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe would qualify under more lenient standards at the end of
the calendar year, as INS officials treated the ceiling figure as a quota it would fill
every year.
221. As with the numbers on refugee status applications, the following numbers
recount the adjudication of asylum cases from fiscal years 1986 through 1992. The
data for fiscal years 1986 through 1989 come from Statistical Yearbook 1986, supra n.
216, at 49; Statistical Yearbook 1987, supra n. 216, at 57; Statistical Yearbook 1988,
supra n. 216, at 57; and Statistical Yearbook 1989, supra n. 216, at 59. The data for
fiscal years 1990 and 1992 come from INS figures published in Refugee Reports, Dec.
21, 1990, at 12; Refugee Reports, Dec. 30, 1991, at 12; and Refugee Reports, Dec. 31,
1992, at 12. For distinctions between communist countries and other countries of
foreign policy concern to the United States and other nations, see supra n. 217.
222. See supra n. 195 and accompanying text.
223. As a result of the Haitian interdiction program, only 28 of the 24,559 people
interdicted from 1981 through September 1991 came to the United States to pursue
an asylum claim. Benoit & Kornhauser, "Unsafe Havens," 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1421,
1451 (1992). For a discussion of deterrence through detention, see supra nn. 96-97
and accompanying text.
224. The U.S. nearly enshrined this distinction into law. In 1986, responding to
an observation by Attorney General Edwin Meese that U.S. law should distinguish
communists from other refugees, Justice Department officials drafted rules providing
that the U.S. would presume that migrants from "totalitarian" nations possessed a
well-founded fear of persecution. Zucker & Zucker, supra n. 8, at 143.
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viewed the refugee problem. A General Accounting Office study
found that among applicants who had recounted threats to their lives
or torture, arrest, or imprisonment in their home countries, 3% of ap-
plicants from El Salvador received approval compared to 55% for ap-
plicants from Poland and 64% for applicants from Iran.225 Any
distinction between "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" governments,
then, do not justify the large differences in asylum acceptance rates
between the two.
Second, the United States has insisted that most people from
Latin America seek asylum for economic reasons, thus justifying
lower approval rates for applicants from impoverished countries.2 26
This argument flies in the face of volumes of statistical data to the
contrary. The large majority of applications for asylum come from
countries with the worst human rights abuses.227 Specific analyses
of the number of people leaving El Salvador 228 and Haiti229 each year
have shown that increases in departure from each country closely
correlated to increases in the amount of political persecution occur-
ring in each country. Therefore, although a recent revamping of the
INS asylum adjudication procedure resulted in some improvement in
asylum acceptance rates from previously disfavored nations, 230 the
asylum adjudication process continues to largely reflect the foreign
policy concerns of the United States.
III. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE PROTECTION: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Like many other Western countries, economic difficulties in the
U.S. have combined with budget limitations to create a degree of
"compassion fatigue" toward immigrants in general, including refu-
gees. The stories highlighting skyrocketing numbers of asylum appli-
cants231 and the implication of asylum applicants in several
notorious terrorist incidents 232 have exacerbated these concerns and
spurred many proposals to reform refugee law.
The reform proposals generally center on dealing with two even-
tualities not foreseen by the Convention. First, the reform proposals
225. Ignatius, supra n. 155, at 124, quoting GAO, Asylum: Uniform Applications of
Standards Uncertain - Few Denied Applicants Deported app. II at 42 (1987).
226. See Loescher & Scanlan, supra n. 8, at 178-79 for rationalizations regarding
Haitians routinely applied to Latin American migrants.
227. Gibney et al., supra n. 218, at 40-41.
228. Zucker & Zucker, supra n. 8, at 224.
229. Benoit & Kornhauser, supra n. 224, at 1451.
230. See National Asylum Study Project, supra n. 162, at 384-85 (improved accept-
ance rates for Haitians, Guatemalans, and Salvadorans).
231. In fiscal year 1993, the INS accepted 147,200 initial applications for asylum,
by far the most ever. Refugee Reports, Oct. 29, 1993, at 16 (quoting INS figures).
232. This included those accused of the World Trade Center bombing and an ac-
cused assassin of a CIA employee. See, e.g., Asylum and Inspections Reform, supra n.
136, at 2 (statement of Rep. Mazzoli).
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seek to find a legally effective way to handle and reject a large
number of people claiming refugee status, arguing that the emphasis
on meticulous individualized decisionmaking emphasized in the Con-
vention arose from a world with much fewer people demanding asy-
lum. 23 3 Second, the reformers aim at establishing procedures
applicable to refugee seekers illegally in a country, a phenomenon not
foreseen by the Convention, which focused on a known refugee popu-
lation.234 Proponents of reform acknowledged these difficulties and
sought to implement structural changes consistent with the general
goals of the Convention, even though the reforms generally would de-
crease the number of refugees accepted by the United States, because
increasing refugee flows risk backlash legislation undermining the
Convention regime. The current proposals have received characteri-
zation both as necessary reform aimed at avoiding more draconian
limitations and as evidence of the backlash itself.
A. Refugee Allocation Shifts
To this point, refugee allocations have remained relatively con-
stant both in terms of the absolute number of people admitted as ref-
ugees and in terms of the regional ceilings.235 While Congress has
not yet challenged these ceilings, one Representative expressed dis-
pleasure with the current ceilings at the most recent congressional
hearings reviewing ceilings proposed by the President. He asked,
"Should we continue the [resettlement] programs from the Soviet
Union? Should we continue programs in Southeast Asia after all
these years, when they are in fact immigration programs rather than
refugee programs?"236 So far, the administration has successfully
maintained that the high ceilings for the former Soviet Union and
East Asia will decrease in coming years as Jews in the former Soviet
Union face lesser risks of persecution and the special Indochinese ad-
mission program attempting to fulfill American obligations from the
Vietnam War fades away, but that family unity concerns compel high
admissions for the present. 237 The United States could, however, in-
clude relatives of refugees within the general immigration program,
while reserving the numbers allocated for refugee admissions to the
most deserving applicants.
233. Martin, "Reforming Asylum Adjudications: On Navigating the Coast of Bohe-
mia," 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1247, 1252 (1990).
234. Id. at 1255 & n. 15.
235. For the current ceilings, see supra nn. 214-215 and accompanying text.
236. Refugee Reports, Sept. 30, 1993, at 2 (quoting statement in congressional
hearing of Rep. Mazzoli).
237. Id.
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B. Streamlining of Asylum Procedures
The Clinton Administration currently contemplates regulations
which would directly refer denied asylum applicants to an Immigra-
tion Judge rather than force the INS to initiate a separate proceeding
before the application goes to an Immigration Judge.238 The Clinton
Administration has also proposed limiting BIA review of decisions of
Immigration Judges to cases presenting "novel questions of law or
good grounds for appeal."239 Neither of these proposals, however,
promises to have much of an effect on streamlining procedures. 240
C. Limitations on Admission Through Asylum
These proposals have taken shape in two statutes currently
pending before Congress. The first statute represents a combination
and modification of previously advanced statutes, and has bipartisan
sponsorship in the House of Representatives. 241 The second statute
represents the proposal of the Clinton Administration, which also en-
joys bipartisan sponsorship.242
1. Preinspection at Foreign Airports
The preinspection provision in the House bill would establish
stations at three of the ten foreign airports with the largest number
of persons directly departing for the United States243 and at three of
the ten foreign airports with the largest number of undocumented
immigrants directly departing for the United States244 for preinspec-
tion of passengers heading to the United States. By uncovering per-
sons lacking proper documentation at foreign airports, the United
States would effectively preclude their passage to the United States
by forcing them to pursue their asylum claims in that country.
The preinspection proposal encounters two difficulties which
make its implementation prospects dim. First, countries will exhibit
great reluctance to allow the United States to prescreen passengers
at their airports, especially when one of the primary goals of doing so
238. Refugee Reports, Oct. 29, 1993, at 2-3.
239. Id. at 3.
240. The BIA reviews approximately 2,500 to 3,000 asylum cases a year. Martin,
supra n. 234, at 1313-14 (citing BIA data). In fact, many of these cases receive abbre-
viated treatment already. Limitation of BIA review, then, would only marginally im-
pact on the efficiency of asylum decisionmaking.
241. H.R. 3363, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (sponsored by Rep. Schumer and Rep.
McCollum).
242. S. 1333, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (sponsored by Sen. Kennedy, Sen. Si-
mon, Sen. DeConcini, Sen. Feinstein, Sen. D'Amato, Sen. Byrd, Sen. Graham, Sen.
Breaux, Sen. Boxer, and Sen. Simpson).
243. H.R. 3363, supra n. 242, § 301.
244. Id. The specific airports involved would depend on the volume of passengers
headed to the United States, the ability of the airports to handle preinspection, and
the willingness of the country to allow preinspection by the United States.
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centers on burdening that country with more asylum applicants. 245
Second, if the country has a record of persecuting refugees or re-
turning refugees to the country of persecution, if the U.S. removed
passengers in those countries in a cursory fashion it would effectively
violate the Convention, because the preinspection by the U.S. would
indirectly result in the return of some legitimate refugees. 246 The
law attempts to account for this latter concern by establishing two
separate safeguards, which may prove more illusory than real. First,
any country the U.S. establishes a preinspection station in must
maintain "practices and procedures ... in accordance with" the Con-
vention. 247 Second, the country must not have served as the source of
a significant number of refugees in the past five years.248
2. Summary Exclusion
The most debated asylum reform concerns expedited exclusion of
persons seeking entry to the United States. The Clinton bill and the
House bill take similar approaches to the issue. Any person seeking
entry to the United States who presents a document misrepresenting
a material fact, or who had presented a document upon boarding but
did not present any documents upon arriving at the United States, 249
would become excludable. 250 Exclusion would occur immediately un-
less the applicant expressed a desire to apply for asylum. 251 At that
point, immigration officials would transfer the person to an Asylum
Officer. 252 The Asylum Officer would immediately interview the per-
son; the Clinton bill would allow the person a right of "consultation"
with another person, but only prior to the interview and provided
that the consultation not delay the interview.253 The Asylum Officer
would determine if the person had a "credible fear" of persecution,
upon which the person could enter the United States and pursue an
asylum claim.25 4 This decision would receive immediate review by
245. Asylum and Inspections Reform, supra n. 136, at 43 (statement of Rep.
McCollum).
246. Id.
247. H.R. 3363, supra n. 242, § 301.
248. Id.
249. S. 1333, supra n. 243, § 2.
250. Id. The House bill would extend this exclusion to any person lacking proper
documentation. H.R. 3363, supra n. 242, § 101.
251. S. 1333, supra n. 243, § 2. The House bill would also delay exclusion if the
applicant expressed a fear of persecution. H.R. 3363, supra n. 242, § 101.
252. H.R. 3363, supra n. 242, § 101. Under the Clinton bill, this Asylum Officer
would have to have at least one year of experience in handling asylum claims. S.
1333, supra n. 243, § 2.
253. S. 1333, supra n. 243, § 2.
254. Id.; H.R. 3363, supra n. 242, § 101. The Clinton bill defines "credible fear" as:
1) a substantial likelihood that the statements of the applicant were true, and 2) a
substantial likelihood that in light of those statements and the situation in the coun-
try of alleged persecution the person could establish eligibility for refugee status. S.
1333, supra n. 243, § 2. The House bill would require that the applicant's statements
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another official. 255 This decision would face no judicial review except
for habeas corpus review essentially confirming the identity of the
person in question.256
The proposal has raised a large number of questions, all of which
illustrate that summary exclusion may prove unworkable or unfair
(or both). The first centers on the ability of Asylum Officers to fairly
make credible fear determinations in places like airports. Empiri-
cally, screening officials in other countries attempting these pro-
grams have made faulty decisions.25 7 Although advocates of this
reform have touted the expertise of Asylum Officers, 25 8 Asylum Of-
ficers still tend to rely too greatly on the State Department or their
own opinions in making decisions. 2 59 Indeed, in this context Asylum
Officers would exclusively rely on their own knowledge of conditions
in countries, which would inevitably result in prejudgments. 260 Sec-
ond, the credible fear standard could do either too much or too little
to exclude people. Empirically, countries employing similar schemes
have excluded only a small percentage of applicants. 2 6 1 If this proved
true in the United States, the expense of establishing the screening
process might outweigh the benefits. On the other hand, the INS has
implied that it believes two-thirds of asylum applicants would not
survive summary exclusion. 2 62 This raises grave concerns that the
more likely than not be true, but would only require a "significant possibility" of refu-
gee status to establish a credible fear of persecution. H.R. 3363, supra n. 242, § 101.
255.. Under the House bill another Asylum Officer would conduct this review.
H.R. 3363, supra n. 242, § 101. The Clinton bill would establish another group of
people with training equivalent to Asylum Officers but independent from the INS to
review .the decision of the Asylum Officer. S. 1333, supra n. 243, § 2.
256. Id., § 4; H.R. 3363, supra n. 242, § 101.
257. Martin, supra n. 234, at 1371 (referring to study of similar procedures in
several European countries).
258. See, e.g., Asylum and Inspections Reform, supra n. 136, at 140 (statement of
Gene McNary, former Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service) (Asy-
lum Officer corps "has received many accolades and been recognized by United Na-
tion's High Commissioner for Refugees, as a model to be emulated by the rest of the
world"); id. at 117 (statement of Chris Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and
Naturalization Service) (Asylum Officer corps "has received favorable reviews from
the refugee advocacy community" and thus "we have a model in place ... that would
enable us" to institute summary exclusion).
259. See supra n. 162 (study finding overreliance of Asylum Officers on State De-
partment opinions); Refugee Reports, Oct. 29, 1993, at 13 (discussing government
study finding that Asylum Officers do not review any outside information for lack of
time).
260. See Asylum and Inspections Reform, supra n. 136, at 444 (statement of Lloyd
Lochridge, Chair, American Bar Association.Coordinating Committee on Immigration
Law); Martin, supra n. 234, at 1333 (unless Asylum Officers well informed, removing
checks on discretion - in this case State Department opinions - leads to more biased
judgments).
, 261. Martin, supra n. 234, at 1371 (citing studies finding 25% exclusion rate in
Germany and 10% exclusion rate in Canada).
262. Asylum and Inspections Reform, supra n. 136, at 74 (statement of Sale) (fa-
vorably comparing credible fear determination for detention, where 33 percent of ap-
plicants meet the credible fear burden).
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"credible fear" standard erected as an additional hurdle for asylum
applicants to leap over could exclude too many people with legitimate
refugee claims. Third, neither bill explicitly says that people will re-
ceive notification of a right to apply for asylum, 263 which creates the
possibility that legitimate refugees will face return because they did
not know what rights they possessed. Fourth, the lack of the pres-
ence of counsel at the credible fear interview (even if the person may
consult with another person beforehand) could inhibit the ability of
the person to present the strongest possible case for admission into
the country under the credible fear test.264 These two objections il-
lustrate the potential that legitimate refugees might prove uniquely
susceptible to exclusion, while the people with dubious claims might
pass the screening only because they received advance "coaching".
Fifth, the limits in the bills on judicial review may not survive consti-
tutional scrutiny.265 Lastly, large-scale summary exclusion may sim-
ply encourage people to enter the country through a land border, over
which the United States has less control.266
3. Time Limits for Asylum Applications
The House bill, in addition to the preinspection and summary
exclusion provisions, contains proposals for a more complete overhaul
of the entire system. The most potentially far-reaching of these
changes would require any person wishing to apply for asylum to file
a notice of intent to apply for asylum with the INS within 30 days of
arrival in the United States, 267 and to file the application itself
within 60 days of arrival.268 A person could file for asylum after that
time only if the person could present clear and convincing evidence of
a change in circumstances in the country of origin making the person
newly eligible for refugee status.269 The proposal targets the people
who stay in the country for substantial periods of time but only apply
for asylum when deportation proceedings commence, largely as a de-
laying tactic.
Proposals to cut off eligibility for asylum after a set time period
have generated fierce controversy. Critics argued that people just ar-
263. Id. at 443 (statement of Lochridge).
264. See id. at 236 (statement of Arthur C. Helton, Director, Refugee Project, Law-
yers' Committee for Human Rights) (asylum applicants in summary exclusion pro-
ceeding should have access to counsel and the UNHCR, including lists of available
free legal services).
265. Id. at 279 (statement of Warren R. Leiden, Executive Director, American Im-
migration Lawyers Association).
266. Id. at 184 (statement of Katherine L. Vaughns, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Maryland School of Law).
267. H.R. 3363, supra n. 242, § 201. The initial version of the bill proposed a 7-day
time limit to file a notice to apply for asylum. H.R. 1679, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2
(1993).
268. H.R. 3363, supra n. 242, § 201.
269. Id.
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riving in the United States would not have sufficient legal acumen to
file a notice to apply for asylum so quickly.270 Further, the refusal to
hear asylum claims because of an artificially imposed procedural
deadline regardless of the potential merits of the claim violates Arti-
cle 33 of the Convention. 271 Proponents have responded that Article
31 places an affirmative duty on refugee seekers to immediately come
forward upon entered the country, and that persons failing to do so
cannot claim any of the rights granted by the Convention. 272 Article
31, however, merely authorizes states to impose "penalties" for not
reporting, not return to a country of persecution. 273 Therefore, a
rigid time bar of this nature, while an attractive means to strike at
questionable asylum claims, does not square with the Convention.
D. Expanded Protection for Refugees
The Convention definition, adopted in the Refugee Act, encom-
passes a lower percentage of refugees today, because it does not cover
victims of generalized violence. 274 As a result, countries have come
under increasing pressure to adopt policies to assist the people who
do not qualify as refugees under the Convention. The United States
has taken some steps in this regard, particularly when it can do so
without making any open-ended commitment to admitting a large
number of people into the country.
The United States remains the leading contributor to the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, whose mandate extends to people
not strictly refugees under the Convention. 275 Also, in 1990 the
United States passed an amendment giving the Attorney General
discretion to extend "temporary protected status" (which prevents de-
portation) to nationals of states where either "(A) the Attorney Gen-
eral finds that there is an ongoing armed conflict...," "(B) ... there has
been an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental
disaster...," or "(C) the Attorney General finds that there exist ex-
traordinary and temporary conditions... ."276 Currently, the United
270. See, e.g., Asylum and Inspections Reform, supra n. 136, at 163 (statement of
Robert Rubin, Assistant Director, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San
Francisco Bay Area).
271. See id. at 187 (statement of Vaughns) (returning legitimate refugees for fail-
ure to meet procedural deadline violates non-refoulement guarantee of Convention);
id. at 241 (statement of Helton) (return of refugees under these circumstances would
violate international guarantee of individualized determination of refugee status).
272. Refugee Reports, Oct. 29, 1993, at 9 (citing remarks made in congressional
hearing by Rep. Mazzoli).
273. Convention, supra n. 2, at Art. 31(1).
274. See supra n. 186 and accompanying text.
275. In 1991, the United States contributed just under $200 million to UNHCR,
comprising 22.4% of total contributions. U.S. Department of State, supra n. 126, at
173.
276. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254a (West Supp. 1993). The statute required that nationals of
El Salvador receive this status.
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States extends this temporary protected status to citizens of Libe-
ria,27 7 El Salvador,278 Bosnia,279 and Somalia.280 The ultimate suc-
cess of temporary protected status, though, will probably depend on
the ability to make these countries safe and habitable again, as the
Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees pointed out in a recent
speech. 28' In addition to extending temporary protected status, then,
the U.S. has sought to discourage huge flows of potential refugees by
attempting to provide international protection for potential refugees
within the borders of their countries. This worked successfully with
regard to the Kurdish population in northern Iraq. 28 2 These efforts
illustrate that the United States has taken small steps to move refu-
gee law beyond the increasingly narrow strictures of the Convention.
They also show, however, that the U.S. has no desire to grant full
refugee status to people not satisfying the Convention definition; any
further progress to protect these people on a permanent basis will
come slowly.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Cold War era brought a shift in United States refugee policy
from an emphasis on domestic policy to an emphasis on foreign pol-
icy.28 3 This meant that a large number of refugees could gain entry
to the United States, but only if the refugees came from countries of
foreign policy concern to the United States. The end of the Cold War
and domestic economic stagnation have returned domestic and na-
tionalistic factors to the forefront in the refugee debate. The case law
and proposed legislation indicate that the United States may become
less of a haven for refugees than before. Still, anti-immigrant atti-
tudes, although widespread, have not extended universally, and refu-
gee advocacy groups remain quite vocal and continue to thwart more
aggressive attempts at restriction. Therefore, while the United
States may adopt screening procedures not contemplated by the Con-
vention, it will not likely forsake its time-honored tradition of ac-
cepting refugees in the future.
277. 58 Fed. Reg. 7898 (1993).
278. 58 Fed. Reg. 32157 (1993).
279. 58 Fed. Reg. 40676 (1993).
280. 58 Fed. Reg. 48898 (1993).
281. M. Douglas Stafford, New Strategies for Refugees in the 1990s, 25 Refugees
10, 12 (1992).
282. Paul Glastris, "Huddled Masses: Anxious Americans Want New Restrictions
and Tougher Enforcement," U.S. News & World Report, June 21, 1993, at 38.
283. See supra n. 10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the four driving
forces of U.S. immigration policy throughout its history.
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